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Abstract
This note discusses two challenges to simulating the social process of science. The ﬁrst is developing an adequately rich
representation of the underlying Data Generation Process which scientiﬁc progress can "learn". The second is how to get
effective data on what, in broad terms, the properties of the "future" are. Paradoxically, with due care, we may learn a lot about
the future by studying the past.
Keywords:
Simulating Science, Algorithmic Chemistry, Evolutionary Algorithms, Data Structures, Learning Systems
 Introduction
1.1 We can view science (leaving aside non-empirical ﬁelds like Post Modernism and Social Theory) as a discovery process. There
is something "out there" which we use a set of shared practices and procedures to build a representation of. This is easiest to
see in ﬁelds like physics where a combination of measuring devices, experiments and theories allow us to say things about the
cooling of a metal bar or the failure of a wire under tension. This view of science raises two linked challenges for simulation.
 The First Challenge: How Can We Represent Science in a Simulation?
2.1 The ﬁrst challenge is: What is an adequate representation of the "something out there" to challenge any model of the discovery
process. It is no use having a very realistic model of the discovery process trying to learn a very unrealistic "environment" or the
results are likely to be nonsense (and not even usable in principle for "policy"). In this sense, unrealistic means very structurally
unlike the "raw material" of real science. In a conceptually novel paper, Birchenhall and Windrum (1998) modelled the process of
scientiﬁc discovery as the learning of a function, with different scientists working on the function at different levels of detail, over
different ranges of values, exchanging information and so on. This is a distinctive use of simulation. Because we know the Data
Generation Process (which we usually cannot observe directly in social science) we can make substantive claims about the
effectiveness of learning processes: "This learning system will tend to discover underlying functions up to this level of difﬁculty".
This means that we are no longer obliged to say exactly what the form of the scientiﬁc "discovery" function is (which is lucky
because it is still unfolding) but only what our reasons are for putting it into a certain difﬁculty class (which connects to the
second challenge below). This approach has "real" implications too. It is well known that "evolutionary" learning processes can
cope better with difﬁcult search spaces than, for example, simple hill climbing. Thus certain features of the scientiﬁc community
(multiple teams working on the same problem, some scientiﬁc "competition" to drive people to new approaches or variations on
existing ones and so on) appear to be capable of giving the advantages of evolutionary search in the system taken as a whole.
2.2 Nonetheless, it is useful to think more carefully about why the business of science cannot necessarily be represented accurately
as a simple function. In dealing with novelty, we must actually develop the concepts (and relations between concepts) we need to
build the representation of what is "out there" pretty much from the ground up. (Something now as "every day" as temperature
was itself, at some point, a concept that needed to be rendered scientiﬁc and operationalised for use as a basis in other scientiﬁc
work. This is one of the challenges that social science faces. It lacks relatively uncontroversial "measurement building blocks"
equivalent to length, mass and temperature in physics. This is because the regularities of physics also apply to its measuring
devices while the same is not true in social science.) This suggests the role of some kind of "dynamic concept network"
representation of scientiﬁc knowledge (as when an overarching theory based on a new representation may "subsume" a whole
sequence of apparently disparate research based on older or disparate representations). Secondly, because science is
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(Fontana 1991) that can actually cope with the arrival of genuinely new elements in the system (and transformations that only
become possible with the arrival of those elements). Thirdly, we cannot treat science as merely an individualised set of papers or
concepts but have to acknowledge the role of institutions as potentially divergent communities of practice and socialising entities.
Thus the ﬁrst challenge is to select (or develop) a relatively simple representation of science on which learning systems intended
to model the scientiﬁc process can be compared. This representation needs to be relatively tractable, but not at the expense of
failing to reproduce the stylised features of scientiﬁc progress as we currently know them: Citation patterns, punctuated equilibria
after major discoveries, long latencies for the "application" of at least some theoretical ideas and so on. Meeting this ﬁrst
challenge also gives rise to the second.
 The Second Challenge: How Can We Get Data About The Future?
3.1 The second challenge is to develop an effective approach to providing data for a simulation of the scientiﬁc process. In particular,
it is very important not to confuse an ability to predict "the future" (which is widely considered to be the goal of science) with an
ability to predict "futures" relative to the time period over which a model has been calibrated. By this I mean that we have
considerable amounts of historical data on which models can be developed and then "tested" even though the predictions made
are actually about events that took place in what is, for us (now), the past. It doesn't seem completely unreasonable that there is
some underlying regularity to patterns of discovery (for example a Zipf distribution on citation patterns identifying the most
important discoveries that happen at more or less similar intervals). Clearly, we cannot say what the next major breakthrough will
be, or exactly when it will occur but we might say, with some plausibility if we use past data, that a model good enough to predict
existing patterns might also suggest ways in which "major" discoveries could be made more frequent or "lost" discoveries be
more reliably avoided.
3.2 Thus the challenge of building a representation of unfolding knowledge which can map onto the "out there" sought by science can
be supported by its ability to represent the processes of formalisation, reconceptualisation, measurement and experiment which
can be observed in historical case studies of science. If we cannot represent what we know has already happened reasonably
economically in our abstraction then we are unlikely to ﬁnd it much use for dealing, even approximately, with what might happen.
Thus, paradoxically, to build models capable of understanding the future, we should look (particularly in "old" domains like
science) very hard at the past. (In this vein, but apparently apocryphally, the bank robber Willie Sutton is supposed to have said
"because that's where the money is" when asked why he robbed banks!)
3.3 Comparative models of the scientiﬁc process which explored its learning potential on a realistic representation of scientiﬁc
knowledge, developed inductively from historical data, would stand at least a reasonable chance of doing what might appear
impossible, allowing us to "model" and compare the efﬁcacy of policies for doing something which, by its nature, is continually
unknowable in its details until it happens.
 References
 BIRCHENHALL, C. R. and Windrum, P. (1998). Developing simulation models with policy relevance: getting to grips with UK
science policy. In P. Ahrweiler & N. Gilbert (Eds.), Computer Simulations in Science and Technology Studies (pp. 183-206). Berlin:
Springer-Verlag.
FONTANA, W. (1991). Algorithmic chemistry. In C. G. Langton, C. Taylor, J. D. Farmer & S. Rassmussen (Eds.), Artiﬁcial Life II:
Proceedings of the Workshop on Artiﬁcial Life, Santa Fe, New Mexico, February 1990, SFI Studies in the Sciences of Complexity,
Proceedings Volume X (pp. 159-209). Redwood City, CA: Addison-Wesley.
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/14/4/1.html 2 31/10/2011